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RECENT CASES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-AVAILABILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS TO
CONSUMERS FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION BY SELLER
Since January 1, 1966, the Bay Area Meat Company' had
sold a quantity of freezers and accompanying stocks of frozen
food products to an estimated 200 California residents in San
Joaquin and Stanislaus counties. To finance the purchases, cus-
tomers had executed two retail installment sales contracts-one
in payment of the freezer, the other for the food-which were as-
signed to three area finance companies. Thirty-seven consumers
subsequently initiated a class action on behalf of themselves and
other unnamed customers seeking rescission of the contracts
and punitive damages for fraudulent misrepresentation by Bay
Area and naming the finance companies as codefendants. The
complaint alleged, inter alia, that defendant's salesmen had
represented the freezers to be reasonably priced and of high qual-
ity and had described the frozen food products to be a seven-
month supply offered at wholesale rates. Plaintiffs asserted that
these misrepresentations were a part of a standard sales monologue
which each salesman had been trained to memorize and recite by
rote to individual customers. Defendants' demurrer was sustained
by the Circuit Court of San Joaquin County insofar as the com-
plaint alleged a class action but was overruled as to the thirty-
seven named plaintiffs.2 A writ of mandate .seeking to compel
the trial court to Vacate its order and allow prosecution of the
fraud as a class action was granted by the California Supreme
Court.3 Held, consumers who have bought merchandise under
installment sales contracts may under certain conditions main-
tain a class action for fraudulent misrepresentation seeking res-
cission of the contracts against both the seller of a product and
the finance company to which the contracts were assigned. Vasquez
v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d
964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
1. Hereinafter referred to as Bay Area.
2. After analyzing California decisional law, the trial court apparently concluded
that past cases which had been unsympathetic to consumer class actions may be out-
moded, but that the appellate courts were better suited to rule on this question. Vasquez
v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. d 800, 806 n.2, 484 P.2d 964, 967 n.2, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796, 799 n.2 (1971).
3. Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d
964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
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A class action, or representative suit, is a legal proceeding in
which one or more members of a group having similar claims
or defenses represent the entire group in litigation.4 The action
is, therefore, an exception to the general jurisdictional rule
that all parties whose rights are to be determined in a legal action
must appear before the court.5 By establishing a technique where-
by the claims of numerous parties can be simultaneously resolved,
however, the class suit promotes jural economy by eliminating
repetitious litigation. Further, the type of injury which tends to
affect the rights or interests of many persons simultaneously is
also apt to involve complicated factual situations and intricate
legal relationships. Redress in such situations is likely to involve
expense totally disproportionate to any individual claims. Here
the class suit provides a remedy for the group wrong by allow-
ing aggregated claims to be prosecuted by group representatives
on behalf of all members. While joinder frequently serves as
an adequate vehicle for pursuit of multiple claims, it is often
impracticable to bring all injured parties before the court. In-
deed, it is generally said that the class action originated in the
courts of equity to mitigate the strict joinder requirements.7 The
United States Supreme Court has noted that:
Where the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights
and liabilities are so subject to change and fluctuation by death
or otherwise, that it would ... oftentimes prevent the prosecu-
tion of the suit to a hearing. For convenience, therefore, and to
prevent failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion
of the parties in interest to represent the entire body .... 8
Representatives of the group may assert the rights of all without
soliciting the presence or consent of othersf A judgment, whether
4. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, chs. VI & VII (1950).
5. This rule can be traced to language in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), and
constitutional notions of due process. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Of course in rem
jurisdiction would attach if a res in which a party may have legal rights was brought
under a court's jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra.
6. Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CiL.
L. REv. 684 (1941) .
7. Id. at 707-08.
8. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
9. It should be noted that some jurisdictions require notice of pendency of suit
to absentee group members before a class action can be maintained. See, e.g., ARiz. R.
Crv. P. 23(c) (2), reported in 16 Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. (1956). In federal courts,
rule 23 (c) (2) requires "individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (c) (2).
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favorable or otherwise, applies to the entire group represented
including those in absentia.10
This adjudication of the rights of absentee members raises
the question of res judicata. The binding effect of class action
judgments was affirmed in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble."
But the constitutional requirement of due process'2 demands that
the named representatives must be such as will fairly insure ade-
quate representation of class members to prevent "fraudulent
and collusive sacrifice of the rights of absent parties . . . ."' The
adequacy test necessitates that the interest of the representa-
tives coincide with those of the group insofar as the questions
and issues in litigation are concerned. Quality of representation
is more important than quantity, and a single class representa-
tive may be sufficient in a proper case.1 4
The evolution of representative suits can be traced to the
English chancery courts.'5 As the procedure was translated in-
to American jurisprudence, common law application was blend-
ed with statutory enactment. The existing requirements for
maintenance of class suits are dependent upon the approach
adopted in a particular jurisdiction. These fall into four basic
classifications: (1) the common law approach; (2) statutes based
on a Field Code amendment; (3) statutes patterned after rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in 1938; and (4)
statutes emulating Federal Rule 23 as amended in 1966.11
The common law approach is based on principles of equity
which parallel those of English chancery. Acccording to Justice
Story, class suits are permitted:
(1) Where the question is one of common or general in-
terest, and one or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the
whole; (2) Where the parties form a voluntary association for
public or private purposes, and those, who sue, or defend, may
fairly be presumed to represent the rights and interests of the
10. The United States Supreme Court has said that as to the members of a rep-
resented class, a decree "binds all of them the same as if all were before the court."
Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853) (dictum).
11. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule,
71 CoLum. L. REv. 609, 611 (1971).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940).
14. See cases cited in C. WRIGnT, LAw oF FEDERAL COURTs § 72 n.31 (2d ed. 1970).
15. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921).
16. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49
B.U.L. REv. 407, 425 (1969).
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whole; (3) Where the parties are very numerous, and although
they have, or may have, separate, distinct interests; yet it is im-
practicable to bring them all before the court.17
Two key elements which can be abstracted from these criteria
are the requirements of a common interest and a class or numerous
body of persons. In the common law system, as distinguished
from the statutory jurisdictions, class suits are permitted only in
equity and not in law.'8 Seven states which have no class action
statutes are guided by these principles.' 9
The Field Code approach is modelled on a class action pro-
vision first appended to the Field Commission recommendations
by the New York legislature which read:
[A]nd when the question is one of a common or general interest
to many persons, or when the parties are very numerous and it
may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one
or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole. 20
This provision is still in effect in New York2' and, with minor
alterations of wording, in fourteen other states including Cali-
fornia.22
Federal jurisdictions recogniied the maintenance of repre-
sentative suits with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938.23 The rule established three categories of
class actions based primarily on the jural relationships of the
17. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS § 97, at 96 (2d ed. 1840).
18. Starrs, supra note 16, at 427.
19. These include Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Tennessee,
Vermont and Virginia. Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 OaE. L. REV. 21, 22
n.8 (1970).
20. [1848] N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 438, § 119.
21. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1005 (a) (McKinney 1963).
22. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 382 (West 1954). For listing of other states with similar
statutory provisions, see Homburger, supra note 11, at n.31.
23. Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted in 1938, provides in part:(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impractical to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more,
as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all,
sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or
against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of
a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought.
236
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parties involved and the substantive rights asserted by or against
them. Each category determined the binding effect of a decree
awarded. The chief draftsman of the rule, Professor Moore, label-
ed each action as either "true," "hybrid" or "spurious."24 In the
''true" class action the named or unnamed parties were either
necessary or indispensable to prosecution of the action and a judg-
ment would bind the entire class 5 A "hybrid" class suit was pro-
secuted by persons having interest in a common property, and thus
the decree rendered bound the rights of the class only in respect
to that property involved.26 "Spurious" actions arose when various
parties having several rights and a common interest in a question
of law or fact sought a judicial remedy by class action for a com-
mon relief.27 In effect, the "spurious" action was a permissive
joinder device binding only those members who participated di-
rectly in the suit.28 Although the Moore system purported to offer
a definitive guide to the propriety of prosecution by representa-
tive suits, the designated nomenclature proved obscure and un-
certain. Nor did the rule generally provide an adequate basis for
ascertaining the limits of class action judgments. Criticism di-
rected at the rule's inadequacies and confused judicial applica-
tion heralded its ultimate doom. But before the rule was amended
in 1966, fifteen states had adopted class action statutes designed
after Professor Moore's scheme 0
The amended rule 23 completely abandons classification
of actions according to jur'al relations and substitutes a terse out-
line of occasions appropriate for maintenance of class suits. Four
prerequisites outlined in the opening section of the rule which
must be met in order to pursue a class action are: (1) a class
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) claims or de-
fenses by the representatives which are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class; and (4) representative parties that will fairly
24. 3B J. MooRE, Fam . PRAcrcE 23.08-23.11 (2d ed. 1969).
25. Id. at 23.11[2].
26. Id. at 23.11[ 4].
27. Id. at 23.11[3].
28. Cf. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
29. See Z. Csi.raa, supra note 4, at 243-95; Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 6, at
695-714.
30. See Homburger, supra note 11, at 626 n.94.
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and adequately protect the interests of the class.31 These elements,
while necessary to the class action, are not alone sufficient. The
subsequent section delineates situations which justify allowance
of a representative suit. Of particular interest is the provision
enumerated in section (b) (3) which authorizes class suits when
the four above mentioned prerequisites are met and
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior .to other
available methods for .the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. 32
The section's generality wisely allows judicial discretion in de-
termining the propriety of prosecuting a claim as a class action.
Courts are specifically granted the opportunity to consider ques-
tions of policy and expediency. It is significant that section (b) (3)
actions, together with civil rights cases, represent the greater
share of class litigation within the federal court system.33 The
amended version of the rule has also spawned its share of emulous
state statutes, which now number eleven.3 4
The class suit has been employed to secure civil rights,s5 to
reapportion legislatures,36 and to challenge welfare eligibility
rules.3 7 More recently this procedure has become attractive to con-
sumer protection advocates seeking defensive weapons with which
to equalize the advantages held by giant retailing and advertising
industries in the commercial arena.38 Illicit trade practices have
the potential to affect every consumer. Yet losses to the
individual from consumer abuses are likely to be small in propor-
tion to the expense of pursuing legal redress.39 By allowing ag-
gregated claims to be prosecuted by representatives, the class ac-
tion countervails the individual consumer's lack of incentive to
31. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(1)-(4).
32. Id. 23(b)(3).
33. See Homburger, supra note 11, at 635.
34. Id. at n.133.
35. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
38. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1967) ; Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1970).
39. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 6.
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sue.4" It is argued that class suits, with attendant damage awards
both punitive and compensatory, would make such wrongful busi-
ness conduct unprofitable, thus having a "therapeutic effect"
on business activities.41
While all jurisdictions have statutory or common law pro-
visions for the maintenance of class suits, 42 differences in court
interpretation and application have affected their potency. In fed-
eral jurisdictions, a serious restriction has recently been imposed.
Federal courts have competency to decide class suits where
diversity of citizenship is involved, but claimants proceeding
under such an action must meet the $10,000 minimum amount in
controversy requirement.4 3 In the recent case of Snyder v.
Harris,44 the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
having "separate and distinct claims" against a common defen-
dant may not aggregate these claims so as to establish the necessary
$10,000 in controversy. It would appear that this decision has effec-
tively foreclosed the possibility of consumer actions in federal
class suits. An additional limitation involves the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 (c) (2) requires "individual notice
to all class members who can be identified through reasonable
effort" when initiating a class suit under rule 23 (b) (3).45 Cost
of such notice is often prohibitive and has proven to be a serious
obstacle to class suits in the federal courts. 6
A comparison of decisional law among the states reveals
that judicial interpretation of class action statutes has created
vast differences in receptiveness to class suits. The divergence ex-
isting between the Field Code states of New York and California
provides a particularly apt illustration. New York evidences a
restrictive attitude. Much of New York's case law reflects the pos-
ture assumed by the early case of Society Milion Athena, Inc. v.
40. Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 80, 81 (1969).
41. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. For an exhaustive compilation and assessment of class action statutes in each
state, see Starrs, supra note 16.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
44. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
46. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), where plain-
tiff would have had to pay over $400,000 in costs for individual notice to other class
members in order to pursue his $70 claim.
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National Bank of Greece47 in which Judge Lehman held that
"[s]eparate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by sim-
ilar means and even pursuant to a similar plan, do not alone
create a common or general interest in those who are wronged." 48
Following that definitional point of view concerning the common
interest requirement for class suit, New York cases have limited
class actions almost exclusively to those situations in which a com-
mon fund or a "privity" among class members exists. 40 Class mem-
bers must seek identical remedies, ° and while declaratory or in-
junctive relief may effectively be sought, award of money dam-
ages is often denied.5 1 A recent disappointment to consumers was
the case of Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America 2 wherein plain-
tiffs, in a class action, sought to recover a statutory penalty against
a finance company which had supplied contracts printed in type
size smaller than that specified by the New York Retail Install-
ment Sales Act.53 The court dismissed the action, failing to
find the requisite common interest and reaffirming the line of
cases which has limited class suits to the "closely associated re-
lationships growing out of trust, partnership or joint venture and
ownership of corporate stock."' 4 Another New York court has
more recently indicated that the aversion toward class suits is likely
to continue, declaring that "[c]lass actions are to be approached
warily since by nature they deprive non-appearing parties, bound
by the plaintiff position, of their separate personal day
in court, as well as their choice of remedy."' Thus even though
New York led the way to codified class action statutes, it has re-
sisted any liberalization, and has continued to apply the most
restrictive interpretations of class action statutes. 0
47. 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939).
48. Id. at 292, 22 N.E.2d at 377.
49. See, e.g., Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.YS.2d
584 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the privity concept as established in Field
Code jurisdictions, see Homburger, supra note 11.
50. Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 129-30, 204 N.E.2d 627, 631, 256 N.Y.S.2d
584, 590 (1965). But cf. Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869,
277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
51. Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287, 3 N.Y.S.2d
581 (1938).
52. 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 811 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
53. N.Y. PEms. PROP. LAW §§ 401-18 (McKinney 1962).
54. 26 N.Y.2d at 402, 259 N.E.2d at 722, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
55. Summers v. Wyman, 64 Misc. 2d 67, 71, 814 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
56. Starts, supra note 16, at 458.
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But in states where courts are amenable to prosecution of
claims by representative suits, experience has revealed that this
device offers great potential for protection of consumer rights.
California, as an example, has recognized that class actions are
among "the most potent ... weapons in the consumer's arsenal.15 7
The extent to which judicial application has influenced this pro-
gress is realized when one considers that the California class action
statute is substantially similar to its New York counterpart.,
Indeed, early decisions in both states reflect some similarity. Thus
in Carey v. Brown,59 the community of interest required to
maintain a class suit meant compulsory joinder as necessary par-
ties. This strict requirement was eliminated in the leading case,
Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Association,0 wherein
a class action was brought igainst promoters of the Rose Bowl
seeking recovery of a statutory penalty for wrongful refusal of ad-
mission to a public place of amusement.6' Plaintiffs alleged that
the promoters had advertised the sale of 7,500 tickets and dis-
tributed numbered stubs to potential buyers, but that on the day
of the game only 1,500 tickets were available and admission stub
holders were denied entry. After a review of California case
law, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were sepa-
rate and distinct and refused to allow the action. While group
members need not be so united in interest as to be necessary
parties, still "the fact that 'numerous parties' have separate and
distinct claims against the same person . . . will not alone suf-
fice to sustain a representative suit where there is no commu-
nity of interest. '6 2  Because each plaintiff would have to
prove his individual participation and ultimate refusal of admis-
sion, the requisite community of interest was not established. Any
liberalization caused by the elimination of necessary parties in
57. Tydings, The Private Bar-Untapped Reservoir of Consumer Power, 45 NOTRE
DAME LAv. 478, 483 (1970).
58. CAL. CiV. PRO. CODE § 382 (West 1954) provides in part:
[IV]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many per-
sons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the Court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
For a comparison of the corresponding New York provision, see supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
59. 58 Cal. 180 (1881).
60. 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948).
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 54 (West 1954).
62. 32 Cal. 2d at 842, 198 P.2d at 519.
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Weaver was restrained by the announcement that class suits must
seek common relief.6 8
The community of interest notion was further explored in
Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Corp.4  There, several cotton
growers initiated a class suit against a cotton gin operator al-
leging that through improper computation of seed weight, the
operator had failed to pay for $2,000,000 of seed. Citing the ex-
tensive review of class suits in Weaver, the court determined that
the essential element in all cases was a common property interest
or common fund of some sort. Finding such a common fund in
the improperly retained seed payments, the court allowed the
action even though plaintiffs' claims arose through a series of
separate transactions.
Five years later, the California Supreme Court in Chance v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County0 upheld a class suit by
victims of a land fraud scheme who were holders of deeds of trust
on more than 2,000 lots in a subdivision. The court rejected the
common fund notion of Fanucchi by equating common fund with,
and thus reinstating, the concept of community of interest. This
term was clarified with the suggestion that where each class mem-
ber must establish his right to recover on the basis of facts pe-
culiar to his own case, community of interest is lacking.
The recent case of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. 60 has gone far in
liberalizing the requirements for maintenance of a class action.
The plaintiff sued on behalf of himself and all other persons who
had patronized the defendant cab company within a four year
period, alleging that defendant's rate meters had been set to charge
fares in excess of those allowed by the Public Utilities Commission.
In allowing the action the court opened up new consumer re-
medies and established certain judicial prerequisites for sustain-
ing a class action: (1) an ascertainable class; and (2) a well-defined
community of interest among the class members in the questions
of law and fact involved. Finding an ascertainable class is not
dependent upon identification of individual members but "depends
... upon the community of interest among class members in the
63. Id.
64. 151 Cal. App. 2d 72, 311 P.2d 33 (1957).
65. 58 Cal. 2d 275, 373 P.2d 849 (1962).
66. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
67. Id. at 704, 433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
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questions of law and fact involved." 68 It is therefore the existence,
not the identity of a class, which must be determined to meet the
court's requirements. As to the previously required necessity of
seeking common relief the court concluded that it has "no com-
pelling importance and its absence presents no insuperable diffi-
culties." 09
In the instant case, the court adopted the two requirements
outlined in Daar for maintenance of class suits. Dismissing the
ascertainability of the class as "no serious obstacle, ' 70 the opin-
ion considered "whether there are issues common to the class as
a whole sufficient in importance so that their adjudication on a
class basis will benefit both the litigants and the court. '71 The
mere fact that each purchase represented a separately consum-
mated transaction could not itself defeat the class suit, so long as
each class member would not be required to establish a right to
recover based on facts peculiar to his own case. Plaintiffs must
demonstrate a community of interest as to the elements
of their claim of fraud. Recovery, therefore, depends on proof
of false representations made with intent to induce reasonable
reliance and of damages suffered thereby. Defendants' demurrer
was deemed to admit plaintiffs' allegation that the misrepresenta-
tions were contained in standard sales monologues memorized
by Bay Area's salesmen and recited by rote to each customer. The
court found that proof of these allegations at trial would raise
an inference that the representations were made to each class mem-
ber.72 The falsity of the representations could also be shown on a
common basis, since proof of allegations regarding the price and
quality of products purchased by the named plantiffs would sup-
ply proof as to all. Since California case law does not require direct
evidence to show reliance upon false representations, the court
held that "if the trial court finds material misrepresentations were
made to the class members, at least an inference of reliance would
arise as to the entire class."7 3 As regards damages, Daar illustrated
that a class action may be maintained even though each class mem-
ber would ultimately be required to establish the extent of his
68. Id. at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
69. Id. at 709, 433 P.2d at 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
70. Instant case at 810, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
71. Id. at 811, 484 P.2d at 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
72. Id. at 812, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr, at 803.
73. Id. at 814, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
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individual injury. The opinion concluded that sufficient allegation
of the requisite community of interest had been made so that the
plaintiffs "should . ..be afforded the opportunity to demon-
strate that proof of most of the important issues as to the named
plaintiffs will supply the proof as to all."74
In deciding the Vasquez case, the court has broadened the
applicability of the doctrines established in Daar in two respects:
(1) the availability of class suits has been extended to consumer
fraud situations; and (2) at least as applied to the particular facts
involved, the propriety of naming assignees of installment con-
tracts as parties to a suit for fraudulent misrepresentations
is upheld. The instant case thus registers a new victory for con-
sumer protection advocates.
The introductory remarks of the court's opinion evidence a
great concern for the plight of the consumer, citing consumer pro-
tection as "an exigency of the utmost priority in contemporary
society." 7 Because mass production is dependent upon an equi-
valent mass consumption, the potential for consumer abuse in-
creases with the pace of economic development. Expenditures
for consumer goods in 1969 were up $39.4 billion over the previous
year, reaching a total figure of $576 billion .7  Enticed by these
statistics, the disreputable merchant has found a lucrative enter-
prise in the practice of fraudulent business schemes. While the
individual losses from such practices are usually relatively small,
the aggregate return to the businessman can be substantial. Even
a small overcharge, when extracted from many customers, can
amount to thousands of dollars in illicit profits. Individual losses
are also apt to be small in proportion to the cost of legal re-
dress, thus discouraging prosecution of violators. A study con-
ducted under the auspices of the University of Pennsylvania" con-
cluded that "[t]he number of consumers having no redress be-
cause the amount lost is not commensurate with the attorney fee
constitutes the vast majority." The study further suggested that
businesses engaged in consumer exploitation appreciate this and
"[i]n many instances fraudulent operators carefully avoid cheat-
74. Id. at 815, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
75. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
76. S. BoOT, 1970 FINANCE FACTS YEARBooK 34.
77. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Pro.
grams for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 395, 409 (1966).
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ing individuals out of large sums of money because they realize
that 'no one bilked out of fifty dollars is going to pay a lawyer to
get his money back.' ",78 The class action represents a valuable
method of consumer redress by aggregating claims that may
otherwise not be prosecuted individually.
While consumer frauds of the type described in the instant
case are a most frequent commercial abuse, courts have had
difficulty finding the community of interest required for mainten-
ance of a class action. Consider an early annotation which indi-
cated that:
Class or representative suits to obtain the rescission of transac-
tions based on similar frauds practiced by one defendant upon
various, and commonly numerous, persons, have so often been
held not maintainable that one may well doubt whether under
any circumstances such a suit will lie.79
The failure of courts to find the community of interest centered
about the requirement of proving reliance of fraudulent repre-
sentations. When separate transactions with various parties are in-
volved, statements made to each purchaser and reliance there-
on would seem to vary from one purchaser to another. Thus proof
of reliance as to named plaintiffs could not provide proof as to
the whole class represented. Even when the false representations
made to class members were exactly the same, the various class
members may have acted upon different opinions and beliefs as
to the facts.
By employing the element of inference, the court in Vasquez
relaxed strict reliance requirements and allowed proof of material
misrepresentations to give rise to "at least an inference of reliance"
as to the entire class. While class action advocates are undoubtedly
pleased by implementation of this device, its full utility cannot
be readily determined. The instant case poses a situation in which
alleged misrepresentations were incorporated within stan-
dard sales monologues, memorized and recited verbatim. Were the
facts altered slightly and, for instance, the monologues provided
were merely suggested for salesmen's use, the application of re-
liance by inference would be questionable.
Nor is the denial of holder in due course defenses to the
finance companies in the Vasquez case to be taken as an established
78. Id.
79. Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1015, 1016 (1938).
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rule in consumer fraud class action suits. The opinion labels as
a "Pyrrhic victory" any judgment rendered against a seller alone.
Certainly it is common for businesses engaged in consumer fraud
practices to be thinly capitalized, and judgments against such par-
ties often remain unsatisfied. But the relief sought in the instant
case includes a claim for punitive damages. Holding a seller's
assignee liable to such claims for fraudulent practices by the seller
alone hints qt the kind of vicarious liability being urged by con-
sumer protection groups. It is argued that such liability will
cause assignees to more carefully investigate sellers' practices be-
fore accepting commercial paper.8 0 The logical conclusion of such
thinking is that sellers employing fraudulent practices will soon
lose assignment outlets and be forced out of the market. Should
a commercial abuse occur the contract assignee is financially more
able to bear the costs of reparation than are the consumers to ab-
sorb losses. It must, however, be conceded that stripping fi-
nance companies of holder in due course privileges may involve
certain injurious ramifications. Additional costs incurred by these
companies for labor necessarily expended in policing sellers' ac-
tivities may be communicated to consumers as increased financing
or service charges. Regardless of the temptation to interpret the
instant case as leading toward some kind of strict liability doc-
trine, the decision was placed on much simpler grounds. The court
was careful to state and reiterate that the finance companies in-
volved were being made party to the action because of allega-
tions that they had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
Bay Area's fraudulent proctices. Thus it would appear that by
maintaining only minimum contacts with seller-assignors, finance
companies can avoid incurring liability under the decision in the
instant case.
The Vasquez case is, nevertheless, a significant ju-
dicial response to the exigent contemporary problem of
consumer abuse. While the limits of the decision's effectiveness
have not been firmly delineated, it is likely that its underlying
reasoning will prove attractive to courts in other jurisdictions.
Because of the similarity in statutory provisions relating to class
suits, Field Code states are especially adaptable to a development
80. See Smit, Are Class Actions for Consumer Fraud a Fraud on the Consumer, 26
Bus. LAW. 1053, 1057 (1971).
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in the use of class actions which would parallel California's pro-
gressive model. Restrictive approaches in states such as New York
fail to recognize the substantial public benefit which can accrue
by a more liberal application of the class action to consumer fraud
situations. Where joinder of parties is impracticable a court's re-
fusal to allow prosecution of claims by class suit may, practically
speaking, leave the injured consumer without legal recourse. But
as one observer has recently noted, when "[f]aced with the choice
of letting wrongdoers retain the fruits of illegal conduct or
venturing into problem areas of class litigation, the [Field Code]
courts all too often have chosen the former alternative.""' The
state of commercial affairs demands that the courts of New York
and similar jurisdictions abandon the strict adherence to decisional
precedent which denies class actions when "separate wrongs to
separate persons" are involved. If common interest among class
members must be found, the Vasquez opinion offers a more rea-
sonable and equitable standard in recognition of the obvious simi-
larity in questions of law and fact among injured consumers.
Only through acknowledgment of consumers' rights will the norm
of responsibility in the giant retailing and advertising industries
be significantly improved.
DAVID A. SANDS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONvERSION OF FINE INTO
TERM OF IMPRISONMENT FOR OFFENDERS FINANCIALLY UNABLE
To PAY FINE HELD VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Preston Tate, an indigent, was convicted of various traffic
offenses which were punishable by fine only. Accordingly, he was
fined a total of $425. Since he was unable to pay the fine, Texas
law required that he be imprisoned for a period of time sufficient
to "serve-out" his fine at the rate of $5 per day. Thus Tate was
sent to prison and after serving 21 days he applied for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that he was unable to pay the fine due to
his indigency. The County Criminal Court of Harris County de-
nied the writ and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed,
rejecting the appellant-petitioner's contention that his impri-
81. Homburger, supra note 11, at 617.
